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Abstract 
Interest in using demand response (DR) resources to supply 
low cost reliability products to the bulk electricity system is 
on the rise due to the uncertain impacts of increasing 
penetrations of intermittent generation and recent rulings 
supporting demand side participation in wholesale markets 
from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.  
However, organized electricity and ancillary services 
markets are just beginning to support DR resources for 
ancillary services, and the set of rules and requirements for 
participation are unique to each market.  This paper 
discusses the opportunities that exist in the ancillary service 
markets in each US Independent System Operator territory 
and identifies challenges to market participation for demand 
response resources.  It compares resource requirements, 
limits to aggregation, measurement and verification, bidding 
requirements, market timelines, and the types of 
organizations that can play in the markets.  Additionally, it 
uses market clearing prices and market size to compare what 
value may be extracted from these markets, and identifies 
how these prices are currently determined.   Using these 
criteria, PJM and ERCOT have the most favorable 
conditions for demand response participation in ancillary 
service markets, and changes to rules that effect aggregation 
and minimum resource size could promote more 
participation in other AS markets across the US.   
1. INTRODUCTION  
Ancillary services (AS) are support services in the 
power system and are essential in maintaining power 
quality, reliability and security.   In the US, there are four 
typical products traded in ancillary services markets run by 
Independent System Operators/Regional Transmission 
Organizations (ISO/RTOs). From the faster to the slower 
acting, these services are: regulation, spinning reserves, 
non-spinning reserves, and supplemental reserves. 
Regulation is used to control system frequency by 
instantaneously maintaining the balance of supply and 
demand. Resources providing regulation products are 
certified by the ISOs to increase or decrease their output to 
follow an automatic generation control (AGC) signal sent 
by the system operator’s energy management system.  In 
some ISO/RTOs, regulation is split into two products, up 
and down.  This means that the regulating resource will only 
be asked to provide a deviation from its normal operating 
point in one direction.  Spinning reserves (sometimes called 
Synchronous or Responsive Reserves) are the portion of 
unloaded capacity of units already connected or 
synchronized to the grid that can be delivered in 10 minutes. 
Non-spinning reserve is capacity that can be synchronized 
and ramping to a specified load within 10 minutes.  The last 
ancillary service in markets, supplemental reserve, is not 
available in all ISO/RTOs and is capacity that can be 
synchronized and delivered to the system within 30 minutes.   
The adoption of state-level renewable portfolio 
standards is pushing the need for additional ancillary 
services and grid flexibility. The additional reserves needed 
depend on a variety of factors from location to adoption of 
different technologies. In California, an increase in the 
regulation capacity is expected [1, 2],while in ERCOT, 
studies suggest that the need for spinning reserves is 
growing [3]. 
As a result, there are many tools that ISO/RTOs are 
looking at to help alleviate the expected grid stress with 
increases in renewable generation, demand response being 
one of them.  Additionally, the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC) has been passing rules in an attempt to 
level the playing field between traditional and alternative 
grid resources such as demand response [4, 5] and 
mandating that fast acting resources be compensated for the 
additional security that their flexibility brings the grid [6].     
Conceptual studies have argued that demand response 
is ideally suited to provide AS to the grid [7, 8] and limited 
field tests [9-12] have examined their technical capability.  
The majority of DR literature focuses on its traditional uses 
such as emergency load relief, system peak management 
and price responsive demand [13, 14,15]. The major 
  
differences between traditional applications of DR and DR 
for AS are the reduction of notification time, and the 
increased speed and accuracy of measurements. 
Additionally, AS requirements vary geographically and they 
are typically needed year round.  
With so much interest in flexible resources like demand 
response providing ancillary services to the grid, it is 
important to understand how much value a new market 
player can extract and which markets are best positioned to 
promote demand side participation.  This analysis attempts 
to compare the value and rules of ISO/RTOs to help make 
the value proposition to demand side market participants 
more transparent.  There will be a discussion of the market 
clearing price for the most valuable ancillary services in US 
ISO/RTOs, then some characterization of market size.  This 
is followed by a comparison of market rules that are critical 
to demand participation.  We will conclude with thoughts to 
bring together the effects of price, size and rules.   
2. METHODS 
The present analysis focuses on the six ISO/RTOs that 
are currently operating ancillary services markets in the US, 
shown in Figure 1.  Those six are the California ISO 
(CAISO), Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT), 
Midwest ISO (MISO), Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland 
Interconnection (PJM), New York ISO (NYISO), and ISO 
New England (ISO-NE).  The analysis attempts to lay out 
relevant information for each ISO/RTO in order to highlight 
opportunities and challenges for industry to explore in these 
markets.  This information is taken from publically available 
data on market clearing prices and procurement volumes 
from each of the ISO/RTO websites.  Additionally, the 
ISO/RTO business manuals and tariffs were consulted to 
gain an understanding of the rules for market participation 
and how they differ between ISOs.   
Figure	  1:	  Map	  of	  ISO/RTO	  Balancing	  Areas	  in	  the	  US	  [16]	  
ISO/RTO Markets were evaluated using hourly price 
and procurement data.  Hourly ISO/RTO Market Clearing 
Prices (MCP) for the years 2009-2011 were gathered using 
Ventyx’s Velocity Suites data base, which queries the 
individual ISO/RTO sites.  MCP is a product of a balancing 
area’s system optimization and is the sum of the availability 
bid and opportunity cost (generally determined through co-
optimization with the energy markets) of the most expensive 
resource awarded ancillary service capacity for each hour.  
In most markets, all awarded resources are paid the MCP 
regardless of how much less the sum of their bid and 
opportunity costs were.  MCP is recorded in units of $/MW-
h, where MW-h represents the value of a MW of capacity 
held in reserve for an hour.  Where available, data on hourly 
AS procurement volumes was collected for the years 2009-
2011.  These values, in MW-h, were gathered either through 
Velocity Suites or through the individual ISO/RTO sites 
themselves.  They represent the amount of capacity 
procured in AS markets, but do not include capacity that 
was self-supplied or contracted out of market.   
With the data collected, an analysis was performed 
using Matlab® to understand the market value of each 
service and the size of the AS markets.  This was done by 
examining average prices and procurement for years, 
seasons, and months to give a sense of magnitude and trends 
in market prices.  Additionally, variation across the hours of 
the day was examined.  Finally, the size of the markets in 
  
dollars was determined through the product of MCP and 
capacity procurement volume.   
3. MARKET VALUE OF ANCILLARY SERVICES 
Two important factors in evaluating ancillary services 
markets are the market clearing price and the size of the 
markets.  The market clearing price indicates what a new 
entrant into the market could expect to make in the near 
term.  However, the effects of a large penetration of new 
low cost entrants into the market are uncertain and may 
have the effect of lowering the clearing price [17].  The 
volume of capacity procured in a market is one indicator of 
how robust it will be to these new entrants.  When analyzed 
together, the market volume and the price paid for a service 
in that market indicate how much money is at stake.  This 
analysis focuses on the two most valuable ancillary services: 
Regulation and spinning reserves.  For reference, non-
spinning reserves tend to be about 7% to 50% of the value 
as spinning reserves, depending on the ISO/RTO, and any 
30-minute supplemental reserves are less valuable than non-
spinning reserves.  
3.1. Market Clearing Price 
The market clearing price is set by the highest priced 
resource that is awarded.  All units in a reserve zone are 
paid the same MCP.   
Table 1 shows the annual average MCP for regulation and 
spinning reserves for each ISO/RTO with AS markets.  
Annual average MCP for regulation has been between 
$37/MW-h and $7/MW-h, with a median value of 
$16.28/MW-h. If we assume that a	   resource provides these 
services for all hours of a 30-day month, these MCP values 
yield revenues between $5 and $26.5 per kW-mo, with a 
median of about $11.7/kW-mo. The annual average MCP 
for spinning reserve among ISO/RTOs is between $3/MW-h 
and $10/MW-h, and a median value of $5.24/MW-h.  The 
ERCOT region in 2011 experienced brief periods of high 
prices that produced an anomalously high annual average of 
nearly $23/MW-h.  This range for the value of spinning 
reserve can be converted to typical DR value units, giving 
us a median value of spinning reserve at $3.8/kW-mo.  
While analysis of the market clearing price for regulation 
provides a relative understanding of the value of the 
product, FERC Order 755 has fundamentally changed the 
way regulation will be compensated in the future by 
including payments for amount and quality of performance 
of the resource.  This is expected to improve the market 
value of fast resources, such as demand response.   
Table 1: Annual average market clearing prices ($/MW-h) for 
regulation and spinning reserves in US ISO/RTOs (Darker cell 
shades indicate real-time markets, lighter are day-ahead 
markets) 
* MCP for spinning reserve is for Mid-Atlantic reserve zone in PJM, while regulation MCP is for all 
of PJM 
 
In all eastern ISO/RTOs, regulation prices have fallen 
by varying degrees in the last three years (MISO, PJM, 
NYISO, and ISO-NE), particularly in NYISO, where the 
average MCP in 2011 is less than a third of the 2009 MCP.  
Conversely, spinning reserve MCPs have largely risen in the 
same period.  However, the trends in the annual average 
should be confirmed by examining plots of monthly 
averages, like those of Figure 2 and Figure 3 used here as 
illustrative examples.   
 
Figure	  2:	  Monthly	  MCP	  statistics	  for	  NYISO	  regulation	  
Figure 2 shows a distinct downward trend in MCP over 
the three year period examined. This is similar to the trend 
in the average annual values in  
Table 1.  In contrast, Figure 3 provides a somewhat 
different picture of the meaning of the annual averages, as 
there is not necessarily a clear overall trend in the data, but 
ISO 
(Reserve 
Zone) 
Regulation (Combined 
or Up/Dn) 
10-min Spinning 
Reserves 
2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011 
CAISO 
(South) NA 
8.06/
6.75 
11.93/
7.27 NA 5.24 9.45 
CAISO 
(North) NA 
5.64/
4.98 
9.21/ 
6.93 NA 4.07 7.23 
ERCOT 9.70/ 7.25 
9.81/
8.27 
22.67/
8.58 9.95 9.09 22.92 
MISO 12.43 12.17 10.83 4.03 4.02 4.03 
PJM* 23.51 17.95 16.42 4.83 5.72 7.91 
NYISO 
(East) 37.20 28.80 11.80 5.13 6.23 7.41 
NYISO 
(West) 37.20 28.80 11.80 4.15 4.41 3.37 
ISO-NE 9.26 7.07 7.16       
  
rather a seasonal effect, in which prices begin to rise in the 
spring in early summer.  In fact, the rise in value of spinning 
reserve in CAISO in 2011 can be attributed to abnormally 
high amounts of rainfall, leading to a higher utilization of 
hydro power in the region for energy rather than ancillary 
services [18].   
 
Figure	  3:	  Monthly	  MCP	  statistics	  for	  Spinning	  Reserve	  in	  
Southern	  CAISO	  
The difference between Figure 2 and Figure 3 
demonstrate why it is important to consider a more granular 
historical price signal when considering the value available 
to new market entrants, especially for demand response 
entrants.  Demand side resources are not available in the 
same quantities year round or even throughout the day [19].  
In order to demonstrate the value to demand resources in 
providing ancillary services, an understanding of both the 
seasonal effects and the daily effects on prices are 
necessary.  Figure 4 illustrates some of these daily and 
seasonal effects on MCP using the regulation up product in 
CAISO South as an example. 
 
 
Figure	  4:	  Boxplots	  indicating	  the	  daily	  and	  seasonal	  trends	  in	  
CAISO	  South	  Regulation	  Up	  markets	  
The boxplots in Figure 4 represent all hourly MCP data 
for three hour blocks for all months of a season.  The bold 
line in the center of each boxplot is the median; the box 
represents the data range from the 25th percentile to the 
75th percentile.  The whiskers are the minimum data point 
and the 90th percentile.  In this particular example, the 
winter months appear to have a large price peak in the 
evening hours between 6 and 9 PM, with a slight peak in the 
morning hours as well in the 6 to 9 AM hour block.  The 
early morning hours have much less value than other hours, 
causing a daily change in the medians of around $10/MW-h.  
This change in value throughout the hours of the day could 
indicate an opportunity for flexible loads able to provide 
services when they are most valuable.   
The example given for summer months in Figure 4 
shows a slightly different characteristic shape in the 
medians.  There appears to be a single peak in the 3 to 6 PM 
block of data with the early morning hours still being the 
least profitable, yielding a larger daily change in the 
medians of approximately $12/MW-h.  The shapes in Figure 
  
4 indicate that some more seasonal loads may be ideally 
poised to take advantage of high prices in different markets.  
The following section will qualitatively describe the trends 
seen in the US ISO/RTO ancillary service markets based on 
analyses similar to those described here.    
3.1.1. Trends in MCP in US ISO/RTOs 
CAISO 
A transmission line known as Path 26 is the divider 
between the major North and South Reserve Zones for 
CAISO.  The MCPs in CAISO South are always greater or 
equal to those of the North because the MCP is the sum of 
the shadow prices caused by relaxing regional constraints.  
As a result, there are very similar trends in the MCP for ASs 
in North and South and only the south will be outlined here.   
 While there does not appear to be any clear overall 
trend in MCP for any of the products in CAISO, there does 
appear to be some seasonal variation, with spring and 
summer months displaying higher MCPs than Winter and 
Fall for all products.  When looking at daily trends in the 
medians of regulation up and spinning reserve, summer and 
fall have shapes with a single peak, while there are two 
peaks in both winter and spring.  The dominant peaks for 
these products tend to be in the 6 to 9PM 3-hour block, 
although during summer that shifts to 3-6PM.  The minor 
secondary peaks are in the mornings and early afternoons.  
Early morning periods (midnight to 6AM) have much lower 
MCPs than any other times in the day, yielding daily 
fluctuations in the medians between $6/MW-h (fall) up to 
$12/MW-h (winter).  Regulation down has very different 
daily trends that may be complementary to regulation up.  
Regulation down has the highest MCP during the early 
morning hours, from 3-9AM, in all seasons.  The rest of a 
day tends to be relatively flat, with a slight dip in the 
medians to a minimum between 6PM and 9PM.  However, 
the overall daily change in MCP is generally no more than 
$3/MW-h, although the summer sees a larger change of 
$6/MW-h.  These trends suggest that for a flexible demand 
side resource, the most successful strategy may be to 
provide regulation down (load increases) as the demand 
ramps up, and then when the demand should be at its peak, 
the value of regulation up (load reductions) is at maximum.  
This seems complimentary to the natural state of most load 
profiles as when the load is low, there is more flexibility to 
increase consumption and when load is high, the most 
flexibility is in decreasing consumption. 
ERCOT 
While	   
Table 1 implies that there is a significant trend upward 
in the MCP of AS in ERCOT, closer inspection of the 
monthly average MCP suggests that there were only two 
months in 2011 that were outliers (and only about 10% of 
the hours of those two months) that have driven the average 
price of AS so high.  If those two months are ignored, then 
there does not appear to be a clear trend over time in the 
price of ancillary services.   
ERCOT is the only other ISO/RTO that splits 
regulation into two products, regulation up and regulation 
down. Like CAISO, regulation down is more valuable in the 
morning hours, particularly during the summer.  The shape 
of the median MCPs for spinning reserve and regulation up 
are very similar to that of CAISO as well; however, the 
daily change in the median can be a bit more drastic.  For 
regulation up, the medians suggest a daily variation of up to 
$20/MW-h.   
MISO 
The MCP for regulation seems to be declining from 
2009 to 2011, based on the monthly averages.  It started 
around $13/MW-h and ended at around $10/MW-h.  The 
same can be said of spinning reserve, falling from nearly 
$4/MW-h down to almost $2/MW-h.   
For both spinning reserve and regulation, the median 
MCP for each three hour block displays two clear price 
peaks for all seasons but summer.  These peaks are from 
9AM to noon, and 6PM to 9PM.  In summer the peak is in 
the 3PM to 6PM block.  The lowest prices for either service 
are in the early morning hours from 3PM to 6PM.  The 
difference between the minimum and maximum medians for 
spinning reserve MCP is between $6 and $8 per MW-h, and 
$6 and $13 per MW-h for regulation.   
PJM 
Market clearing prices for regulation in PJM fell 
between 2009 and 2011, and in this case the drop displayed 
in the annual averages, from about $23.5/MW-h to 
$16.4/MW-h well represents the trend.  Additionally, MCP 
of regulation appears to be highest during the summer 
months and lowest during the winter. The MCP of spinning 
reserve trended slightly upward, with some seasonality 
indicating slightly lower prices during summer months.  The 
MCP of spinning reserve for PJM used in this analysis 
corresponds to the Mid Atlantic reserve region; other 
reserve regions in PJM have very low MCPs for spinning 
reserve.  The low MCPs throughout the rest of PJM may be 
due to an abundance of self-scheduled reserves, or to PJM’s 
unique tiered structure to spinning reserves. PJM considers 
all capacity that is not fully loaded do to economic energy 
dispatch to satisfy their reserve requirement, so there may 
not be much need to deploy any additional spinning reserve 
through their markets. 
There does not appear to be significant variation in the 
median MCP for regulation throughout the day in all 
seasons but summer in PJM.  However, the distribution of 
  
MCPs during the early morning hours appears to be much 
wider, and skewed toward values higher than the median, 
indicating more variability and higher average prices in 
those hours.  The summer has some significant variability, 
with peak hours between 4-6AM, and a daily variation in 
the medians of approximately $10/MW-h with afternoon 
hours being the least valuable.  The shape of median MCPs 
for regulation in PJM indicate that very different types of 
end use loads may be better suited to extract value from this 
market than CAISO, ERCOT, and MISO.  The daily trends 
for spinning reserve had very similar daily trends in the 
medians as was seen in other ISOs, with summer showing 
the largest variation at nearly $7/MW-h in the medians.   
NYISO 
New York ISO has two reserve zones, East and West of 
the Central East interface.  Regulation is shared among 
these reserve zones, but spinning reserves are not. When 
examining the trends in monthly average MCP, it is very 
clear that regulation fell significantly between 2009 and 
2011, from above $45/MW-h for the first few months of 
2009 down to below $10/MW-h for the last few of 2011. 
The average MCP of Spinning Reserve in NYISO East may 
have a slightly positive trend from 2009 to 2011.  In the 
West, MCP for spinning reserve fell in price, particularly in 
the last 6 months of 2011.   
Examining daily variation of the median price for 
Regulation shows that Spring and Summer months have 
relatively stable MCPs throughout the day, while winter and 
fall see wider variation with a two peak shape, both before 
and after typical work hours.  Spinning Reserve MCP in the 
East has a very similar shape to most other ISO spinning 
reserve markets, with daily variation of the medians of near 
$10/MW-h. However, in the west there does not appear to 
be much seasonality at all in the shape. For all seasons, the 
early morning hours have prices near zero and nearly half of 
the day has an almost constant price of $7/MW-h. 
ISO-NE 
In ISO New England, the only product examined in this 
analysis is regulation.  From 2009 to 2011, ISO-NE’s 
Regulation MCP generally trends downward, beginning 
2009 near $11/MW-h and falling down below $7/MW-h by 
for most of 2011.  The medians of the three-hour block box 
plots suggest that ISO-NE maintains a fairly consistent 
MCP for Regulation throughout a day, with the Winter and 
Spring being slightly higher priced than Summer and Fall.    
3.2. Market Capacity Volume 
Capacity volumes in ISO/RTO administered ancillary 
services markets vary by the size of a balancing area and 
how the balancing area determines its reserve requirements. 
Some balancing areas determine their requirements based on 
the forecasted load, while others base it on time of day.  
Table 2 lists the average hourly capacity procurement in 
markets in which data was available.  This data represents 
only the capacity that was purchased in the markets, and 
does not include any capacity that was self-scheduled or 
contracted for.  In the table, CAISO is broken into North 
and South, and the capacity reported for PJM’s Spinning 
Reserve Market is only representative of the Mid-Atlantic 
Reserve Zone.  The table indicates that ERCOT holds the 
most spinning reserve procured in its markets, and that PJM 
has the largest amount of Regulation.  The hourly capacity 
procurement data was not available for NYISO or ISO-NE, 
so these two ISOs will be omitted.  
Table	  2:	  Average	  hourly	  in-­‐market	  capacity	  procurement	  volume	  
[MW-­‐h]	  for	  some	  US	  ISO/RTOs	  from	  2009-­‐2011	  (Darker cell 
shades indicate real-time markets, lighter are day-ahead 
markets)	  
[MW-­‐h]	  
Regulation	   Spinning	  
Reserves	  Up	   Down	   Combined	  
CAISO-­‐S	   91	   94	   	   227	  
CAISO-­‐N	   92	   98	   	   289	  
ERCOT	   628	   606	   	   1715	  
MISO	   	   	   396	   978	  
PJM	   	   	   824	   418	  
To put the average size of these AS markets into 
perspective, it is helpful to consider the average loads in the 
ISO/RTOs.  In 2011, the average load in CAISO was 25.8 
GW [18], making the total regulation (up or down) and 
spinning reserves procurement in market approximately 
0.7% and 2.0%, respectively, of average load.  In ERCOT,   
regulation (up or down) and spinning reserve are 1.6% and 
4.5% of the 2011 average load of 38.2 GW [20].  In MISO, 
0.6% and 1.5% of the 2011 average load of 64.6 GW [21].  
And in PJM, regulation is 1.0% of the 2011 average load of 
82.5GW [22].  As the spinning reserves reported are only 
for one of three reserve zones in PJM, they are only 0.5% of 
the 2011 average load.  The variation in the relative size of 
the market volume is likely due to varying levels of self-
scheduled AS that are not awarded via market mechanisms.  
The ancillary services markets are very small when 
compared to the energy markets in ISO/RTOs, but there is 
some uncertainty into the effects of this size.  Traditional 
economic logic would suggest that a small market would 
not have a robust price, but due to the co-optimization of 
energy and ancillary services, it is possible that the ancillary 
services markets will be fairly robust to changes in a portion 
of their resources precisely because it is so small compared 
to the energy market.  However, if the latter is true, then 
there will likely be a tipping point of low cost resource 
penetration in which the MCP  begins to fall precipitously to 
zero (or whatever the availability bid will be).  
  
3.3. Market Size 
Using the data for MCP and the capacity procurement 
volumes, an estimate of annual market size in dollars was 
calculated for some of the ISO/RTOs. Table 3 displays the 
annual market size of regulation and spinning reserve 
markets in the US in millions of dollars per year. The 
market size for 2009 for both CAISO and MISO could not 
be calculated because of incomplete data.  The data suggests 
that the deepest markets are in ERCOT’s, although the spike 
in 2011 is largely due to a single month’s extremely high 
prices.  
Table	  3:	  Annual	  market	  size	  (M$/yr)	  of	  US	  ISO/RTO	  Regulation	  
and	  Spinning	  Reserve	  Markets	  (Darker cell shades indicate real-
time markets, lighter are day-ahead markets)	  
[M$/yr]	   CAISO-­‐S	  
CAISO-­‐
N	   ERCOT	   MISO	   PJM	  
Regulation	  
2009	   NA	   NA	   105	   NA	   160	  
2010	   12	   12	   118	   43	   126	  
2011	   18	   12	   152	   38	   123	  
Spinning	  
Reserve	  
2009	   NA	   NA	   119	   NA	   24	  
2010	   11	   14	   122	   33	   32	  
2011	   19	   18	   462	   23	   51	  
4. MARKET RULES AFFECTING DR 
PARTICIPATION 
Understanding the value of demand response in ISO/RTO 
markets is an important indicator of the opportunities that 
exist in the markets.  Other important factors affecting 
market participation include the market rules as well as the 
regulatory and retail environments that these markets reside 
in.  In the present paper, we consider some of the market 
rules at the wholesale level that affect DR participation in 
AS, but do not focus on the retail and regulatory context 
which can greatly influence the desire for these pro.   
Rules and requirements that define ancillary services 
and dictate resource participation in ancillary service 
markets are not consistent across all ISO/RTOs.  In this 
section, rules that effect demand response participation are 
compared across all markets.  These rules are grouped into 
those that affect the size of the resource, the measurement of 
the resource, and who and when resources are bid into the 
markets.  These rules were gathered from the business 
practice manuals, tariffs, and protocols of the various 
ISO/RTOs [23-34].   
The magnitude of the effect of each market rule on 
participation varies.  Rules that effect resource size tend to 
be the most important, because these exclude market 
participation for many resources.  Rules effecting metering 
and telemetry may be the next most important, as they effect 
the capital investment required to enable a resource for 
market participation.  Next, the possible exclusion of certain 
business types from being able to directly interact with 
markets can impact profit streams and exclude innovation 
by start-up organizations.  Lastly, the discussion of bidding 
timelines is also important, but likely not the most critical, 
as these rules will impact the forecasting capability and the 
uncertainty inherent in resource capacity that is bid. 
While these rules can have large impacts on the 
participation levels of DR, there are other influences to 
participation not covered in this analysis.  Retail and 
regulatory environments may play a large role. In ERCOT, 
for example, the business model for demand response 
providers has the added challenge of a highly competitive 
retail energy market with considerable uncertainty in 
customer retention for retail energy providers.  The risk that 
customers could change providers from month to month 
makes a DR enablement investment less appealing.  In areas 
with regulated utilities, the cost of ancillary services is often 
a pass through.  This provides little incentive for the utilities 
to pursue less expensive means to provide these services 
outside of regulatory intervention.  Opening the ISO/RTO 
market rules up to demand response is important, but are not 
the only things preventing it from participation in these 
markets. 
4.1. Resource Size 
Demand response and other demand side resources will 
be smaller than traditional generators, and may be limited in 
the contiguous period in which they deliver a service.  Table 
4 and Table 5 describe the rules that affect the size of 
resources in Regulation and Spinning Reserve markets, 
respectively. These rules include the minimum resource 
capacity, whether or not aggregation of independently 
metered demand side resources is allowed, and limits on 
capacity for continuous energy delivery.  Additionally, all 
ISO/RTOs but CAISO and ERCOT require that Regulation 
be supplied symmetrically in the up and down direction.  
	  Table	  4:	  Rules	  effecting	  size	  of	  Regulation	  Resources	  	  
	  	   Min.	  
Size	  
(MW)	  
Aggregation	  
Allowed	  
Symmetric	  
Bid	  
Continuous	  
Energy	  
Period	  	  	  
CAISO**	   0.5	   No	   No	   60	  min	  
ERCOT	   0.1	   No***	   No	   NA	  
MISO	   1	   No	   Yes	   60	  min	  
PJM	   0.1	   Yes*	   Yes	   NA	  
NYISO	   1	   No	   Yes	   NA	  
ISO-­‐NE	   NA***	   NA	   NA	   NA	  
*Requires approval.  
** Forthcoming, WECC does not currently allow demand side resources to provide this product.   
*** Pilots are underway to examine the ability to change this rule. 
ISO-NE is the only ISO/RTO that prohibits demand 
response resources in their regulation market, although it 
  
has been running the Alternative Technologies Regulation 
Pilot Program to examine including other resources, 
including DR.  CAISO is developing a market model to 
allow demand side resources into the regulation and 
spinning reserve markets, in spite of the fact that the 
Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC), the 
reliability regulatory body that CAISO’s territory is in, does 
not currently allow demand side resources to participate in 
either market.  
Splitting the regulation market into two parts, up and 
down, as was done in ERCOT and CAISO, may lead to 
more participation than in the other symmetric ISO/RTO 
regulation markets as loads and those who run programs for 
them are more familiar and capable of reducing load than 
increasing it.   
In CAISO and MISO, there is a requirement that a 
resource providing AS must maintain its full AS capacity 
for a specified time in order to be certified and to bid into 
their AS markets.  This continuous energy delivery 
requirement does not exist in the other ISOs for regulation. 
In most cases, certification is accomplished by 
demonstrating that the resource can follow a test AGC 
signal over a specific period of time.  This requirement has 
the effect of artificially limiting the participation of some 
energy limited resources, such as demand response and 
storage.   
Rules for allowing aggregation are believed to be of 
critical importance, because allowing aggregation can 
greatly increase the size of available resources to the market 
and lead to a more reliable, consistent response [8]. 
Table	  5:	  Rules	  effecting	  size	  of	  Spinning	  Reserve	  resources	  	  
	  	   Min.	  Size	  
(MW)	  
Aggregation	  
Allowed	  
Continuous	  
Energy	  Period	  	  	  
CAISO**	   0.5	   No	   30	  min	  
ERCOT	   0.1	   No***	   NA	  
MISO	   1	   Yes	   60	  min	  
PJM	   0.1	   Yes*	   NA	  
NYISO	   1	   No	   60	  min	  
ISO-­‐NE	   1	   Yes	   NA	  
*Requires approval.  
** Forthcoming, WECC does not currently allow demand side resources to provide this product.   
*** Pilots are underway to examine the ability to change this rule. 
4.2. Metering and Visibility 
Metering and visibility refer to the metering and 
telemetry requirements for both settlement and operator 
visibility purposes levied on participants in an ISO/RTO.  
Telemetry refers to real-time meter data that is sent to the 
ISO/RTO over a secure connection with rapid periodicity 
for operational visibility.  In this analysis, metering refers to 
revenue metering, sent to the ISO/RTO for settlement 
purposes, at much slower periodicities.  As demand side 
resources are considerably smaller than traditional 
generators, metering and telemetry can be a large expense 
when enabling a resource to participate in AS markets 
relative to the value they receive from providing such 
services.  Table 6 displays some rules that may be 
particularly relevant for demand side resources.   
Metering accuracy affects the cost of the meter.  As 
accuracy improves, costs increase.  Requirements for 
revenue metering accuracy (in Table 6) are generally greater 
than telemetry metering accuracy in ISO/RTOs.   
Telemetry is always required for regulation and in some 
ISO/RTOs it is also required for spinning reserve (SR in the 
table).  By removing that requirement, the business case for 
DR is improved.  In PJM, the data granularity is 2 seconds 
for telemetry, but it can be batch sent once every minute for 
DR resources which is a much less stringent requirement, 
particular for aggregated resources that utilize some front 
end computation in order to send their telemetered data. 
In MISO, metering accuracy is not specified at the ISO 
level, but rather MISO accepts the requirements of 
individual states.  This is in stark contrast to all the other 
ISO/RTOs who set the requirements themselves. 
Some ISO/RTOs require there to be actual data 
collected and reported all the way to each individual 
resource, while others are content with verifiable aggregate 
level data for all of the resources in aggregation.  The ability 
to provide aggregate data opens the door for advanced 
modeling techniques of aggregations that may reduce 
overall costs to provide telemetered ASs.   
Table	  6:	  A	  selection	  of	  ISO/RTO	  metering	  and	  telemetry	  rules	  
	  	  
Metering	  
Accuracy	  
Telemetry	  
Rate	  
Telemetry	  
for	  SR	  
Data	  
Level	  
CAISO	   +/-­‐	  0.25%	   4	  sec	   Yes	   Resource	  
ERCOT	   +/-­‐	  2%	   3-­‐5	  sec	   No	   Aggregate	  
MISO	   State	  Spec	   4	  sec	   Yes	   Resource	  
PJM	   +/-­‐	  2%	   2	  sec	   No	   Aggregate	  
NYISO	   +/-­‐	  2%	   6	  sec	   Yes	   Resource	  
ISO-­‐NE	   +/-­‐	  0.5%	   10	  sec	   Yes	   Resource	  
4.3. Market Bidding 
The last set of rules indicates when and who can bid 
into the markets.  Table 7 indicates the bid timeline for each 
ISO/RTO.  For the real-time markets, ‘-1D’ indicates the 
day before, ‘OH’ indicates operating hour, and ‘OI’ 
indicates Operating Interval (15 minute rolling intervals in 
CAISO, and 5 minute in MISO).  ISO-NE uses the results of 
its Forward Reserve Market in its energy market to dispatch 
its Spinning Reserves, and thus does not have a separate 
reserve market.  As most ancillary services are procured in 
  
the day ahead markets, demand side resources will want to 
participate in those markets.  In some demand side 
applications, these bid times could increase the level of 
uncertainty in the available capacity of demand available to 
provide the ancillary service.  Thus, earlier bid times may 
reduce the amount of resources in the market. 
Table	  7:	  Bid	  Timelines	  for	  ISO/RTO	  AS	  Markets	  
	  	  
Day-­‐Ahead	   Real-­‐Time	  
Bid	  Closes	   Awards	   Bid	  Closes	   Awards	  
CAISO	   10:00	  AM	   1:00	  PM	   OH-­‐75min	   OI-­‐7.5	  min	  
ERCOT	   10:00	  AM	   2:30	  PM	   OH-­‐60	  min	   OH-­‐30min	  
MISO	   11:00	  AM	   3:00	  PM	   OH-­‐30	  min	   OI-­‐5min	  
PJM	   NA	   NA	   6PM	  -­‐1D	   OH-­‐30min	  
NYISO	   5:00	  AM	   11:00	  AM	   OH	  -­‐90min	   OH-­‐30min	  
ISO-­‐NE	   NA	   NA	   NA	   	  NA	  
 
In addition to the timeline of the markets, the markets 
also limit who can bid demand side resources into the 
markets.  In both ERCOT and CAISO, all market 
participants must be represented by a specific entity (a 
Qualified Scheduling Entity in ERCOT, or a Scheduling 
Coordinator in CAISO) that is financially responsible for all 
interactions with the market and undergoes special 
certification.  For demand side resources in their AS 
markets, CAISO requires that the scheduling coordinator 
must be the Load Serving Entity (LSE) which precludes 
Curtailment Service Providers (CSPs) from participation.  
Although all of the other ISO/RTOs allow CSPs to 
participate in their markets, several of the states within the 
MISO footprint preclude CSPs from offering programs.  
CSPs who want to participate in the NYISO programs have 
an additional layer of complexity as they must interact with 
the transmission owner, who generally is the provider of 
telemetry data directly to the NYISO.  
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The interest in fostering demand response participation 
in ancillary services markets requires a clear financial 
incentive and the market structures to capture it.  This paper 
attempts to bring more transparency to the incentives 
available in each of the ISO/RTO AS markets.  In addition, 
it identifies some rules that may make certain markets more 
favorable than others for demand response participation. 
Two markets stand out as clear locations with 
potentially the best demand response opportunities.  PJM 
has the most favorable market rules for demand response 
participation, particularly because its telemetry requirements 
are the most flexible, the bid is closest to real time, and they 
allow aggregation in all products.  The market value in PJM 
is fairly consistent, with typically average MCP and some of 
the largest markets in the US.  The one challenge in PJM 
may be the symmetric bid requirements for providing 
regulation. 
ERCOT also seems to be a good fit for demand 
response participation.  Prices in ERCOT are typically high 
and the volumes are large relative to the size of the system.  
Additionally, the market rules are more favorable for 
promoting demand side resource participation than most 
other ISOs, and they have split regulation up and regulation 
down products, allowing for asymmetric regulation bids 
which should be good for demand response resources.  Once 
aggregation is allowed in ERCOT, this may be the best 
ancillary service market opportunities for DR in the US. 
To further promote participation of demand response in 
ancillary service markets, other ISO/RTOs should consider 
reducing the minimum capacity for participation and 
allowing aggregated demand response resources. CAISO 
appears to have the closest to favorable market rules in 
those respects.  
While PJM and ERCOT do appear to have the most 
opportunity for demand response, the regulatory and retail 
context of these markets was ignored in this discussion.  
This will likely play a large role in actual participation of 
demand side resources in ancillary services markets.  Future 
work examining the interaction between retail and 
wholesale environments would be very valuable.   
The market clearing prices for ancillary services display 
clear daily patterns in some markets that some demand 
response resources may be able to profit from. The 
flexibility and availability of some resources may 
correspond to high prices, allowing them to capture more 
revenue, especially in markets that have separate regulation 
up and down products.  This result suggests that analysis of 
the value of ancillary service participation for demand 
response markets should include daily and seasonal 
variation in market clearing prices. 
The analysis presented here assumes that market prices 
will be relatively consistent despite addition of new 
resources to the markets (e.g., demand response).  This 
assumption may not hold given how small these markets are 
relative to the size of the overall energy market.  
Additionally, the mechanisms by which regulation will be 
compensated are changing as a result of FERC order 755.  
These changes should improve the business case for fast, 
accurate resources that can provide ancillary services, like 
demand response.  
Future work is planned to augment the present analysis. 
This includes an examination of measurement and 
verification standards, including baseline calculation 
methods, as they are substantially different for demand 
response in ancillary services markets than other types of 
DR and an analysis of the operational models developed for 
  
  
the inclusion of demand response in ISO/RTO unit 
commitment and dispatch. 
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